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MACHIAN TIME IS TO BE ABSTRACTED FROM WHAT CHANGE?
Edward Anderson1
Abstract
“It is utterly beyond our power to measure the changes of things by time. Quite the contrary, time is an abstraction
at which we arrive through the changes of things.” Ernst Mach [1].
What change? Three answers to this are ‘any change’ (Rovelli), ‘all change’ (Barbour) and my argument here for the
middle ground of a ‘sufficient totality of locally relevant change’ (STLRC) giving a generalization of the astronomers’
ephemeris time. I then use STLRC as a selection principle on existing and new approaches to the Problem of Time
in Quantum Gravity. Emergent Jacobi-Barbour-Bertotti time can be interpreted as arising from a STLRC, resolves
the classical Problem of Time and has an emergent semiclassical counterpart as regards facing the QM Problem of
Time.
1 Introduction: Machian time and three different attitudes to it
Any change and all change were considered in, respectively, e.g. Rovelli’s [2] and Barbour’s [3] Foundational Questions
Institute contest winning essays of 2008. A third answer I offer here is a sufficient totality of locally relevant change
(STLRC), which gives rise to a generalized local ephemeris time (GLET). See also e.g. [5, 6, 7, 8, 4] for these three
points of view; in the present article I argue in favour of this third perspective.
I first analyze these in terms of three separate alternatives concerning what constitutes a good clock.
1A) Any subsystem suffices as a clock or 1B) some subsystems are better clocks than others.
2A) Clocks are localized subsystems or 2B) clocks are to factor in changes of the actual subsystem under study [9].
3A) The less coupled one’s clock and subsystem under study are, the better the clock is, or 3B) the two fundamentally
have to be coupled. This last alternative can be resolved with a compromise: take a small but strictly nonzero coupling,
so the subsystem under study only very gently disturbs the clock’s physics (this additionally fits in with how nothing
can shield gravity).
Perhaps then, time is to be abstracted from any change [1A)]. I will refer to this as AMR timekeeping after Aristotle,
Mach and Rovelli, since it is similar to ‘tot tempora quot motus’ - so many times as there are motions - the Scholastics’
interpretation of Aristotle (see p 54 of [10]). This carries connotations of 2A), which is also widespread in modern
Theoretical Physics [11], probably for the reason given in II) below.
Perhaps instead time is to be abstracted from all change in the universe. I will refer to this as LMB timekeeping
since it is Barbour’s position [6, 7] and leans on Leibniz as regards the universe itself being the only perfect clock.2 This
rests on 1B) and 2B) and the following further principle.
4) ‘The more change the better’.
Moreover, in LMB timekeeping, 4) is taken to its logical extreme:
5) ‘include all the change’.
Much can be learnt by contrasting the ‘any’ and ‘all’ positions. 5) provides, within the context of 2B), an incontestable
time, in that there are no more changes elsewhere that can cause one to doubt such a time. 1A) has an underlying sense
of ‘democracy’, argued to be useful in generic situations that are crucial in General Relativity (GR), by which there
would appear to be no privileged time standard. But 1B)’s ‘meritocracy’ is in close accord with mankind’s history of
accurate timekeeping; both Barbour [3] and I invoke this as useful evidence, although it leads each of us to different
conclusions.
1APC, Universite´ Paris Diderot and DAMTP, Cambridge, edward.anderson@apc.univ-paris7.fr
2‘Perfect’ here is meant at the classical level. See e.g. [52] for various obstructions to the notion of perfect clock at the quantum level
(finite probability of quantum clocks running backward, Salecker–Wigner inequalities).
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Sidereal time is kept by the rotation of the Earth relative to the background of stars, and served satisfactorily as a
timestandard from Ptolemy [12] until the 1890s. Barbour [3] pointed out that this reflects 1B), to the extent that by
those 2 millennia’s standards, it is reliable for making predictions about the other celestial bodies, unlike solar time.
[Moreover, his argument is for apparent, rather than mean, solar time, which is far closer to sidereal time and was
indeed likewise used reliably.] Sidereal time served well since the Earth’s rotation is stable to 1 part in 108, alongside
the background of stars only changing very slowly. It also reasonably embodies 2A) since the Earth is localized in
comparison to the solar system.
The main point of discussing sidereal time is, however, its demise due to irregularities in the Earth’s rotation. This
was noted via departures from predicted positions, especially noticeable for the Moon. As De Sitter said [13], “the
‘astronomical time’, given by the Earth’s rotation, and used in all practical astronomical computations, differs from the
‘uniform’ or ‘Newtonian’ time, which is defined as the independent variable of the equations of celestial mechanics.”
This difference was addressed by using the Earth-Moon-Sun system as a superior timestandard provider [1B)], to be
solved iteratively by Clemence’s proposal [9, 44]. This is known as ephemeris time. It is a prime example of the
highly Machian perspectives 2B) and 4) [for all that Clemence did not present it in such philosophical light], whilst also
avoiding the extreme position embodied by 5).
Of importance for further understanding the different timestandards in use today [14], there is a divergence between
civil and dynamical timekeeping, due to the Earth’s far more central role in the former. Everyday life is run according to
the Earth’s physics, despite the small tidal braking on its rotation. There have been two subsequent significant changes
to timekeeping.
I) Relativistic effects are significant at accuracy of 1 part in 1012, which became relevant in the late 1970s. Thus one
ceased to be able to time-keep within Newton’s conception of time; its relativistic replacement has the novel feature of
depending on the position and velocity of the clock (by GR redshift and SR time dilation respectively).
II) Advent of atomic clocks. It was these that permitted accuracy to exceed the above figure in the late 1970s; by
today we have individual clocks with accuracy of 2 parts in 1016 [15]. These accuracies exceed those of astronomical
timestandards, which are limited by not knowing the detailed composition of solar system bodies. This goes a long
way toward explaining why astronomical timestandards have become rather less well-known in Theoretical Physics. In
contrast, atomic clocks, have simple and well-known internal constitution and physics, whilst being designed for great
stability. They are small [2A)], all the better for shielding them from disturbances and being convenient ‘reading hands’
from which to quickly take note of times.
However, are atomic clocks a fully independent paradigm, or are they more like far more wieldy reading hands than
the position of the Moon, but that, nevertheless, need recalibrating? A fundamental issue is that [16, 9], independently
of how stable the clock is, why should what it it reads out correspond exactly to the dynamical time (an SR-and-GR-
upgraded counterpart of the Newtonian time) of the system under study? As it happens, in the early days of atomic
clocks it was established that they read out ephemeris time to at least 1 part in 109 [17], which greatly eased the
transition from ephemeris to atomic timestandards. However, this has the status of a null experiment, so one should
keep on testing whether it continues to hold true as accuracy improves.
After all, it was along these lines that one took the Earth not to read off the dynamical Newtonian time in the
upgrade from sidereal to ephemeris time. Moreover, it helps here to decompose 2B) into two logically-possible problems:
with the physics of the clock itself, and with the clock-reading not corresponding to the parameter that most simplifies
the equations of motion, which are more holistic in depending on the system under study rather than the clock. The
Earth is a ‘dirty clock’ due to its complex and partly unknown internal dynamics, whereas atomic clocks are designed
to be far cleaner. This is unless the holistic effect occurs at some level; have we seen any evidence for this yet? For
sure, the leap seconds that one adjusts some years by are not of this nature, as they concern adjusting civil time to
compensate for irregularities in the Earth’s rotation. Further adjustments (3 to 5 orders of magnitude smaller) between
‘barycentric dynamical time’ (for space science) and ‘terrestrial time’ (for science on Earth) are fully accounted for by
standard relativistic physics. To that accuracy, at least, modern astronomical timestandards can be readily obtained
by shifting atomic ones, so no holistic realizations of 2B) are in evidence. This is worth pointing out since i) elsewise
the revelation that Clemence’s work on ephemeris time is conceptually Machian might well be taken to carry holistic
connotations. ii) Nevertheless, one might keep an open mind as to whether holistic connotations will show up at some
level much finer than the sidereal to ephemeris time transition of the first half of the 20th century, by developing a
Machian time program as well as treating the minutiae of further improving atomic clocks.
Taking the above insights on board, a small amount of generalization leads to the following third picture for a practical
LMB-CA timekeeping (the C stands for ‘Clemence’). This represents ‘middle ground’ between Barbour and Rovelli’s
positions whilst being maximally in accord with mankind’s history of accurate timekeeping.
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2 Generalized Local Ephemeris Time (GLET) procedure
The third option considered in this paper is that perhaps time is best in practice abstracted from a STLRC. This gives
a Generalized Local Ephemeris Time (GLET), which is a timestandard of the LMB-CA type. I.e., do not just use a
change to abstract a time, but also check whether using it in the equations of motion for other changes suffices to predict
these to one’s desired accuracy, in accord with 1B), 2B) and 4).
Note that, in comparison to AMR, it has the explicit extra element of acknowledging that some times are locally more
useful than others. For, even in generic situations, one can locally consider a ranking procedure for one’s candidate
times, alongside a refining procedure until the sought-for (or physically maximal) accuracy is attained. Whilst these
may well give a less accurate local timestandard than that for the highly non-generic Earth-Moon-Sun system, say, these
should nevertheless still give rise to an extremum. This establishes that Rovelli’s good idea of considering genericity is
not solely the province of ‘any time’ approaches. Also, in comparison to LMB timekeeping, the ephemeris-type method
as used in practice for the solar system is entirely adequate without having to consider the net physical effect (tidal
effect) of very distant massive bodies as per Sec 4. Thus the LMB-CA account of practical timekeeping holds without
need for LMB’s whole-universe extreme 5), which is a sensible avoidance for the following reasons. Firstly, the details of
very distant bodies are but inaccurately known to us. Secondly, it would open Pandora’s box as regards how to reconcile
Leibniz’s meaning of ‘universe’ with that of modern GR cosmology.
The GLET procedure thus entails not just using a change to abstract a time, but also checking whether using this
time in the equations of motion for other changes suffices to predict these to one’s desired accuracy. If the answer is
yes, then we are done. If not, consider further locally-significant changes as well/instead in one’s operational definition
of time (locally significant as judged by the criterion in Sec 4). Then if this scheme converges without having to include
the entirety of the universe’s contents, one has found a LMB-CA time that is locally more robust than just using any
change in order to abstract a time, and it is particularly useful for equations of motion in, and propositions conditional
on, this time.
Where in space the timestandard is supposed to hold matters once accuracy exceeds GR and SR corrections. Abstracting
time from the Earth-Moon-Sun system does notmean finding time throughout some box whose side is some characteristic
length for this system. Different objects moving in different ways therein will need specific SR and GR corrections to
the timestandard if that is to attain a certain level of accuracy.
3 Jacobi-Barbour-Bertotti approach to the Problem of Time
The relational reformulation of mechanics [5] and GR [18, 19] produces a candidate time function that I refer to as the
Jacobi-Barbour-Bertotti (JBB) time, tJBB [6, 20, 21, 4]. This can be interpreted as of LMB or LMB-CA form (see Sec
4 for this distinction), and it clarifies and resolves many parts of the notorious Problem of Time (PoT) in Quantum
Gravity. The present article argues that the LMB-CA implementation of Mach’s ‘time is abstracted from change’ is of
particular merit and thus should be considered as a possible guide among the many facets of, and strategies for, the
PoT. The reader should be warned that the PoT is often mistaken for the quantum-level Frozen Formalism Problem
of eq (7). In fact, this is but 1 of around 8 facets that the PoT possesses [22, 23], 7 of which already have classical
counterparts in GR, and 5 of which are even present in a suitably relational reformulation of classical mechanics for the
universe as a whole. This classical part of the PoT can be viewed as a tension in the idea of ‘time for the universe as a
whole’ [4, 23]. It consists of the following parts.
1) Temporal Relationalism. Following Leibniz [24], one postulates there to be no time for the universe as a whole.
In this sense, there is a classical Frozen Formalism Problem right from the outset, from insisting on modelling closed
universes from a background-independent perspective. Leibniz’s idea can be mathematically implemented by considering
parametrization-irrelevant actions that include no extraneous time-like variables such as absolute Newtonian time or the
GR lapse [26]. Such actions are then of Jacobi type [25] for mechanics or of Baierlein-Sharp-Wheeler type [26] for GR-
as-geometrodynamics (i.e. formulated as a dynamics of 3-geometries). For now, I only present the Jacobi reformulation
of mechanics, which follows from the action principle
S =
√
2
∫ √
E − V ds , for kinetic arc element ds :=
√
mIdqI 2 (1)
for particle positions qIµ (with particle index I and spatial index µ, particle masses mI , potential energy V and total
energy E. Actions of this sort were in use for many years prior to realizing that these are (or are easily recastable as)
manifestly temporally relational, via the work of Barbour and collaborators [5, 6, 18, 27, 28, 29, 21, 4]).
As envisaged by Dirac [30], parametrization-irrelevant actions oblige the appearance of constraints that are (i.e. solely
due to the structure of the Lagrangian rather than requiring any kind of variation). In the present case, the structure
of the Lagrangian gives a single primary constraint that has quadratic and no linear dependence in the momenta. For
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mechanics, this is the energy constraint H := T +V = E; in the GR-as-geometrodynamics analogue below, we shall see
the Hamiltonian constraint arise likewise, whose form is well-known to lead to the quantum Frozen Formalism Problem
facet of the PoT (although it is far less well known to arise by the complete chain of reasoning I emphasize above).
Moreover, one can now resolve the classical Frozen Formalism Problem via a JBB emergent time [6, 20, 21] that
simplifies the momenta and equations of motion; its form is
tJBB = tJBB(0) +
∫
ds
/√
2{E − V } . (2)
It attains this simplification by being a relational recovery of the Newtonian time of ordinary Mechanics [6]. It is an
example of Mach’s ‘time is abstracted from change’; on the face of it, it is an LMB implementation since all changes
are present in the ds, though Sec 4’s explanation of the nontrivial way in which this timestandard is in practice to be
interpreted makes it LMB-CA.
To proceed to more complicated examples, and further PoT facets, we need the notion of configuration space Q. This
is the set of possible values that can be taken by the configurations QA of one’s theory, e.g. relative particle positions
for relational particle mechanics (RPM) or spatial 3-metrics for geometrodynamics. Moreover, these are examples of
configuration spaces with redundancies, which play a substantial role in the following.
2) Configurational Relationalism [5, 18, 32, 21, 4]. Here, one subjects a configuration space Q to some group G of
transformations that are held to be physically irrelevant. Physics is presented in this way for mathematical convenience
(it is usually hard to work on the quotient space Q˜ := Q/G that is free of such redundancy) and covers both spatial
relationalism and the internal groups of irrelevant transformations of ordinary Gauge Theory. The one builds one’s
action out of not dQA but dgQ
A := dQA− →Gdg QA (for this Paper’s examples, the group action
→
G on the QA themselves
cancels out in the action). For instance, for RPM’s, G consists of translations, rotations and dilations (or some subset of
these due to whether scale itself is absolute or relative and observing that removing the translations is mathematically
trivial [21]). For geometrodynamics, G consists of 3-diffeomorphisms.3 Whilst the auxiliary variable here is usually
taken to be the shift multiplier coordinate [26], it breaks manifest parametrization irrelevance, so it is replaced by the
cyclic velocity F˙
µ
of a new ‘grid’ variable [28]. Then an archetypal RPM action is 4
S =
√
2
∫ √
E − V ds , ds := ||ρ˙− B˙ × ρ||2 , (3)
and the action for GR in relational form is [18, 27]5
S =
√
2
∫
d3x
√
h
∫ √
R− 2Λds , ds := ||h˙−£F˙h||2M/2 . (4)
These are both of the general form
S =
√
2
∫
NOS
dΩNOS
∫ √
W ||dgQ||M , (5)
for NOS the notion of space in question (Σ for geometrodynamics, trivial for RPM’s), W = E − V (mechanics) or
W = R− 2Λ (GR) and ||dgQ||M the G-corrected kinetic line element with configuration space metric M.
Then one gets as a primary constraint an energy equation for the RPM and the Hamiltonian constraint
H := Nµνρσpiµνpiρσ/
√
h − {R − 2Λ}
√
h = 0 for GR. Also, variation with respect to the G-auxiliaries produces linear
constraints, LinZ, e.g. L :=
∑
i ρ
i
× pii = 0 (zero total angular momentum for the whole universe, from varying with
respect to the rotational auxiliary Bµ) for the given RPM, or the GR momentum constraintMµ := −2Dνpiνµ = 0 from
varying with respect to Fµ. Solving the GR momentum constraint at the Lagrangian level for the F˙
µ
is the Thin Sandwich
Problem [26, 31]. This is traditionally taken to be a second PoT facet [22], though I have generalized this facet a) to
the arbitrary-G case of this extremization/reduction procedure: Barbour’s Best Matching Problem [5, 18, 32, 29, 21, 4],
and b) to Configurational Relationalism itself: applied at whatever (rather than the Lagrangian) [23]. Since the RPM’s
3As regards other possibilities, one can additionally include plain or global-volume-preserving conformal transformations [57]. G = id fails
for GR [58], but is consistent in the case of the strong-coupled limit of gravity [27].
4ρiµ are mass-weighted Jacobi inter-particle cluster relative coordinates with conjugate momenta piiµ; these are the most convenient
relative coordinates due to their diagonalizing the RPM’s kinetic term. The lower-case Latin letters are relative particle (cluster) labels
running from 1 to N – 1 for N the number of particles, and the lower-case Greek letter are spatial indices.
5For geometrodynamics, the spatial topology Σ is fixed and taken for simplicity to be compact without boundary. hµν is then a spatial
3-metric thereupon, with determinant h, covariant derivative Dµ, Ricci scalar R and conjugate momentum piµν . £ ˙F is the Lie derivative with
respect to F˙
µ
. Λ is the cosmological constant. The GR configuration space metric is Mµνρσ := {hµρhνσ − hµνhρσ}, i.e. the undensitized
inverse DeWitt supermetric [40] with determinantM and inverse Nµνρσ that is itself the undensitized DeWitt supermetric, hµρhνσ−hµνhρσ/2.
The densitized versions are
√
h times the former and 1/
√
h times the latter. To represent this as a configuration space metric (i.e. with just
two indices, and downstairs), one uses DeWitt’s 2-index to 1-index map [40].
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in 1- and 2-d [21] do have this extremization resolved,6 they serve as examples of how to resolve the PoT in approaches
that eliminate Configurational Relationalism right at the outset.
Then in the presence of Configurational Relationalism, the emergent JBB time becomes subjected to the above
extremization becoming attainable,
tJBB = tJBB(0)+
extremum
g ∈ G of S
(∫
||dgQ||M/
√
2W
)
. (6)
It remains a simplifier for the momenta and dynamical equations of the system; in the GR case, tJBB amounts to the
relational recovery of proper and cosmic times in suitable contexts. Overall, solving the Best Matching Problem facet
of the PoT once and for all at the classical level gives one an explicit expression for the emergent JBB time that solves
the classical Frozen Formalism Problem.
3) The Classical Problem of Observables/Beables. Classical Dirac Observables [33] are functionals
D = F[QA, PA] that Poisson-bracket-commute with all of a theory’s constraints, whereas classical Kucharˇ observables
[34] K = F[QA, PA] do so just with the theory’s linear constraints, LinZ. Bell [35] introduced the name and concept of
‘beables’ as more appropriate than ‘observables’ in the context of whole-universe Cosmology.
The Problem of Observables/Beables is then that it is hard to construct a set of these, particularly for gravitational
theory. Clearly Kucharˇ beables are more straightforward to construct (though opinions differ as to whether these are
sufficient to resolve this Problem). Note also that Rovelli’s partial observables [8, 2] do not require any commutation,
thus giving an approach with even less requirements.
Now, a second consequence of solving the Best Matching Problem is that this very straightforwardly implies having
a full set of Kucharˇ beables: functionals K = F[Q˜A, P˜A] (for Q˜A coordinates on Q˜). On the other hand, Halliwell [36] has
shown how to construct objects that Poisson-brackets-commute with the quadratic constraint in theories with trivial G,
and I have extended this construction to nontrivial-G 1- and 2-d RPM examples [37]. Thus Kucharˇ or Dirac resolutions
of the classical Problem of Beables facet of the PoT ensue.
Three further PoT Facets at the classical level – the Constraint Closure Problem [23], the Foliation Dependence
Problem [22, 23] and the Spacetime Reconstruction Problem [41, 23] – can all be overcome by the nature of the algebraic
structure of the GR constraints [58, 59, 18, 19, 60, 23]. The last of the three is overcome via part of the Barbour-type
relational program itself. Moreover the three are also absent, trivial and trivial for the 1- and 2-d RPM models. The
obviously-named Global PoT facet [22] is classically present but can be taken to concern how time is but a coordinate
in GR and coordinates are but in general locally valid - on charts - and we moreover know how to mesh between charts.
Patching GLET’s together is one way of addressing part of this. The final PoT facet - the Multiple Choice Problem
[22] - is purely quantum-mechanical. Thus, overall, the classical PoT is resolved for 1- and 2-d RPM’s and, modulo the
Thin Sandwich Problem [31], for GR-as-geometrodynamics, by a combination of the Barbour-type relational approach
and the benevolence of the constraint algebras in question.
At the quantum level, the PoT has further roots in the conflict of definitions between ‘time’ in each of GR and ordinary
Quantum Theory [22, 38, 39, 8, 21, 23]. This incompatibility complicates replace these two branches with a single
framework in situations in which both apply, such as in black holes or the very early universe. Now, the purely
quadratic constraint H becomes
ĤΨ = 0 (7)
(as opposed to e.g. a time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation
ĤΨ = i∂tΨ (8)
for some notion of time t); the GR case of (7) is the Wheeler-DeWitt equation [40, 41]. This is the quantum-level
Frozen Formalism Problem, and an apparent disaster occurs: using tJBB fails to unfreeze this equation, so the classical
resolution of this facet cannot continue.
A striking resolution, however, is that the emergent semiclassical time approach produces a new time that is both
approximately aligned with tJBB and itself as much of an LMB-CA implementation of Machian time as tJBB is [46, 21].
I.e, a somewhat more ‘bottom up’ recovery of the classical notion; semiclassicality suffices for e.g. many quantum-
cosmological applications such as the possible quantum origin of microwave background inhomogeneities and galaxies
[42]. This semiclassical approach requires both a WKB ansatz for the wavefunction and for 3B) to hold (hence the
compromise we made).
The Configurational Relationalism facet of the PoT remains solved; to some extent one likewise has quantum Kucharˇ
beables, and Halliwell has provided a separate method for constructing semiclassical quantities that commute with Ĥ
[36]; I have again combined the two methods for 1- and 2-d RPM’s [37, 43, 21].
6This follows from 1) Kendall’s work [53] in the statistical theory of shapes as applied to mechanics in [54, 21] and 2) forming cones over
this [55, 21], which is a construct that also occurs in Molecular Physics [56].
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The four further PoT facets at the quantum level are as follows. At the QM level, we do not know how to replace
the Dirac algebra’s trident of resolutions: one expects a Functional Evolution Problem [22] (QM-level version of the
Constraints Closure Problem), a QM Foliation Dependence Problem and difficulties with Spacetime Reconstruction at
the QM level. (The last of these is necessary due to the dynamical object being 3-geometries, and the QM fluctuations
of this no longer all being embeddable into a single notion of spacetime [41].) 1- and 2-d RPM’s themselves fortunately
remain free of these in parallel to the classical resolution [21]. The Global PoT is altogether harder at the QM level:
how does one mesh together unitary evolutions? The Multiple Choice Problem also now appears, and is responsible for
my ‘to some extent’ clause; further work is needed on these two facets.
4 Using tJBB in practice: which changes are relevant?
To fulfil the true content of LMB-CA, all change is given opportunity to contribute to the time. However only changes
that do so to within the desired accuracy are actually kept. Making approximations at the level of the terms in the
formula (3) fails to capture the relevant physics approximations. E.g consider the Earth-Sun-Andromeda system. Whilst
V due to Andromeda is felt by solar system objects, what counts is that is felt extremely evenly by them all, so it has
no appreciable role in the physics of the solar system itself. [For V , Andromeda being far is offset by it being massive —
mA/ρEA versus mS/ρES. But in the equations of motion, one is to compare tidal-type terms mA/ρ
3
EA versus mS/ρ
3
ES,
so Andromeda being far now greatly dominates it being massive.] Thus one must get the equations of motion from (3)
and then assess approximations there.
I argue against Barbour’s terming tJBB “the” ephemeris time because ephemeris time is not a unique entity, nor does
the method he presents entail any of the specific properties of any iterative procedure used to compute an ephemeris
time [45]. The relational underpinning itself does nothing new for the actual physical calculation of the ephemeris
time, whereas the practical knowledge of how to handle the solar system physics iteratively to set up the ephemeris,
which was developed without ever any reference to relationalism, is fully used. In particular, the formula for tJBB is
not directly implementable (even in cases for which its extremization is explicitly solvable for, itself another problem
with any practical use of that formula). On the other hand, the relationalism does provide an alternative philosophical
underpinning by which the astronomical timestandard calculation can indeed be said to rest on a relational rather than
absolute view of the universe.
Finally, ‘heavy’ degrees of freedom contribute to the zeroth-order estimate for tJBB [20] in the quantum-cosmological
setting. While this might look more like AMR than LMB(-CA), I subsequently show in [46] that it can be taken as the
zeroth order part of a perturbation scheme which does give whatever other degrees of freedom opportunity to contribute
to the time at first order.
5 ‘Marching in step’ criteria?
In the Newtonian picture, all good clocks happen to march in step with absolute time. A stronger position on this
concerns how clock manufacturers’ antecedents separately agreed with natural standards rather than merely with each
other. I.e. they had to produce useful devices where the measure of that usefulness was marching reasonably well in
step with solar system phenomena such as night and day, where the Sun appears in the sky, or the length of the seasons.
Clock designs failing to march in step with such things would be deemed to be poor and selected against by people
wishing to keep successively more accurate appointments. Thus the agreements to reasonable approximation between
all surviving types of clocks have a clear mechanism behind them. In the Newtonian picture, one might tie this up with
some kind of postulate that the celestial bodies move in very close accord with absolute time.
Barbour then suggested [3] that in the relational LMB picture, rather, good clocks are ‘marching in step’ with the
emergent JBB time. He argued furthermore that this criterion applies universally, and uniquely to this timefunction.
Unfortunately, Barbour’s term ‘marching is step’ also carries connotations of a concept that is far more often called
synchronicity [10]. This matters because the mechanics argument Barbour gives carries straight over to the GR case,
for which it cannot hold by how relativistic synchronization requires a procedure rather than just occurring naturally.
Alerted thus, it is straightforward to spot that Barbour’s argument contains a theory-independent circularity [21] (he
substitutes the quadratic constraint into a rearrangement of itself).
Thus the universal basis for marching in step is lost, so one is left having to consider a procedure for approximately
patching disparate observers’ GLET’s together.
6
6 Patching GLET’s together
Consider modelling two quasi-isolated island subsystems within a universe. Then Sec 4’s approximation applied to each
will ensure that the details of the other’s contents will contribute negligibly. Thus each’s timestandard constructed as a
GLET would be independent of the other’s. Thus ephemeris time type constructions do not in practice by themselves
appear to provide a common timestandard. [There is a JBB timefunction that interpolates between the two; however,
neither observer would know enough about the other’s local island subsystem so as to be able to at all accurately
compute that interpolatory function.]
A more relevant line of enquiry may be how observers in different places will have access to different changes. Whilst
the GLET’s these establish will not in general march in step with each other, the GLET concept has a physically natural
means of approximate patching via examination of those changes in the universe that can be observed by both of the
observers. For, by each choosing a time that works well for the STLRC observed by each observer, both times work well
to describe the mutually-observed change, so the two timestandards are reasonably accurately synchronized. (This is up
to a linear transformation that gives each observer freedom in choice of time-unit and of ‘calendar year zero’.) There are
two strengths of sharing: of the same subsystem versus of the same type of subsystem (for types that have sufficiently
universal physics, in parallel to ‘standard candles’). Pulsars might often serve as shared observable subsystems, due to
their long-range detectability as well as longevity and regularity. Cosmological observations might also serve, though
only very inaccurate timestandards ensue from them (at least for observers with our technology and history). Two
comments are in order.
1) Unlike the incontestability of LMB by including all changes, practical LMB-CA timestandards involves may still be
contestable by external physics; e.g. if the Solar System does not keep time with the pulsars, which do we consider to
be at fault?
2) Patching together GLET’s may well be of relevance to travel and settlements in space.
7 Conclusion: ties to Problem of Time approaches
To look into resolving the Problem of Time (PoT), it greatly helps to have the deepest possible understanding of time
itself. This Paper suggests time is conceptually a generalized local ephemeris time (GLET) based on a sufficient totality
of locally relevant change (STLRC) — a particular interpretation of Mach’s ‘time is to be abstracted from change’, and
one that holds even truer to the Astronomy that inspired Barbour’s own whole-universe interpretation. I portrayed
emergent Jacobi-Barbour-Bertotti time tJBB as a GLET and as a resolver of the classical PoT modulo one being able to
solve the Best Matching Problem for whichever specific case one is investigating; a further bonus of solving this is that
Kucharˇ beables are then known. Let us finally use the GLET concept as a selector and remoulder of a more general
set of PoT strategies: does one seek to find or append a time prior to quantization, to obtain an emergent time after
quantization, to take the timelessness at face value or to consider the notion of history to supplant that of time (Histories
Theory)? Below is an approach favoured by this paper’s considerations for.7
The ‘time after quantization’ semiclassical approach very nicely embodies GLET; it is quite, but not perfectly, aligned
with [20, 46, 21] the classical tJBB. There is [46] a semiclassical parallel of the classical perturbative scheme mentioned
in Sec 4 that is likewise LMB-CA; the timestandard it produces is, to high accuracy not quite the same as tJBB, which
is to be expected since quantum changes now contribute.
Many approaches that take the timelessness of (7) at face value at the primary level have subsequent semblances of time
that are based on the ‘any’ implementation [11, 48] (or Barbour’s ‘all’ implementation [47, 7]). I already argued how
much of Barbour’s records scheme could be recast in terms of local records [49, 21]; now also the associated semblance
of dynamics scheme would likewise be recast as local. Thus this sort of scheme survives, as does the Conditional
Probabilities Interpretation [11] where the conditioning now ends up being preferentially based on the GLET rather
than just ‘any’ clock variable. [21] contains a tabulation of timeless strategies that allow for each of ‘any’, ‘all’ and
‘STLRC’ interpretations for each’s semblance of time (thus roughly multiplying the existing count of such strategies by
a factor of 3). Histories Theory [50] can also be rendered compatible with GLET.
7Time being a GLET based on a STLRC can be used as a sweeping argument against each of the following approaches presented in the
reviews [22]. a) hidden times (hidden within the general classical theory), b) the matter times (obtained by appending matter that provides
a time), and c) unimodular time (from a dynamically-arising cosmological constant) of ‘time before quantization’ schemes [22, 39]. This is
because these are all abstracted from particular changes rather than giving all changes an opportunity to contribute. Case-by-case arguments
against each of these are given in [23, 21]; on some occasions [e.g. some reference fluids examples of b)] the matter in question is not only
appended for the purpose of having a time but also intangible, giving it rather too many parallels to absolute time for comfort.
Finally, a lot of uses of the word ‘relational’ in Ashtekar variables/Loop Quantum Gravity [8] are, rather of the AMR ‘any’ form, suggesting
far from maximal exploitation of the full meaning of ‘relational’ hitherto in that literature. Thus the present work should unleash quite a
conceptual revolution in that subject too.
7
The semiclassical approach is foundationally unsatisfactory on other grounds: its crucial WKB assumption is not
internally justified in this scheme [22]. However, combined histories-records-semiclassical approaches [51, 36, 37, 21] do
better in this regard. Schemes of this nature can indeed also be taken to live within the STLRC interpretation of Mach’s
‘time is abstracted from change’. One such combined scheme is the setting for Halliwell’s [36]; this is also precisely the
same setting as that I mentioned at the end of Sec 3 as regards promoting 1- and 2-d RPM quantum Kucharˇ beables to
semiclassical quantum Dirac beables. Thus, combined with Endnotes 5-6), this accounts for 6/8ths of the PoT for the
RPM models in question.
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